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INTRODUCTION 
A popular movement is sweeping across Europe aimed at restricting 
the public expression of European Muslim identity.1 Perhaps the best 
known example is the 2004 French law banning students, parents, and 
teachers from wearing hijabs (and other "ostentatious" religious symbols) 
in public schools.2 Meanwhile, several German states have made it illegal 
for school teachers to wear headscarves, and the city of Maaseik in 
Belgium banned the wearing of the burqa.3 In 2010 the French passed a ban 
on full-face veils,4 while laws targeting the burqa are under consideration in 
Belgium, Quebec, and the canton of Aargau in Switzerland.5 
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 1. According to a Pew Research Poll in April and May 2010, bans on facial veils are supported 
by large majorities of British, French and German voters. See Steven Erlanger, Parliament Moves 
France Closer to a Ban on Facial Veils, N. Y. TIMES, Jul. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
07/14/world/europe/14burqa.html. 
 2. For an excellent overview of the debates over the passage of the French headscarf law, see 
JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE AND PUBLIC 
SPACE (2006). 
 3. As of 2006 eight German states placed at least some restrictions on the wearing of the 
headscarf by public officials-including Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, the two major Catholic states 
in Germany. See Länderscahe: Der ewige Streit um das Kopftuch, ZEIT ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2006. In 2006 
a Belgian court upheld a burqa ban enforced by the city of Masseik. Burqa ban in Belgium upheld, 
ISLAM IN EUROPE (Jun. 15, 2006), http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2006/06/burka-ban-in-belgium-
upheld.html. Around the same time the Dutch proposed and then backed off from a broad ban on the 
burqa before settling on a narrower French-style ban on the wearing of burqas in public schools. See 
Dutch government proposes a ban on wearing burqas in public, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-11-17-dutch-burqas_x.htm?csp=34 The Netherlands: 
Government Said to Back Off Burqa Ban, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
01/24/world/europe/24briefs-burqa.html; Burqa ban extended to universities, DUTCH NEWS, Nov. 26, 
2008, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2008/11/burqa_ban_extended_to_universi.php. 
 4. The law bans garments “designed to hide the face” in a wide variety of “public” places, 
including streets, markets, private businesses and public transportation. French `Burqa’ Ban Passes 
KAHN_FINAL 7/7/2011  11:07:30 AM 
568 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:567 
Nor is the anti-Muslim sentiment limited to clothing. In 2006 
Denmark enacted citizenship examinations and mandatory declarations to 
make sure prospective immigrants have appropriate values.6 Under the law 
prospective immigrants must declare that they "understand and accept" that 
"men and women have equal rights and obligations," while agreeing that 
female circumcision and "the use of force to contract marriage" is illegal in 
Denmark.7 
The construction of Muslim religious buildings has also come under 
fire. In 2009 Switzerland passed a referendum banning the construction of 
minarets.8 Polling data shows that large percentages of the population of 
several European countries either supported the Swiss ban or proposed 
similar bans in their own countries.9 
Finally, the Danish newspaper, Jyllands Posten, published twelve 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed (including one showing a bomb 
in his turban).10 The cartoons, which many Muslims found offensive,11 
came on the heels of provocative anti-Muslim statements from leading 
figures in Danish public life, such as culture minister Brian Mikkelsen who 
 
Last Legal Hurdle, FRANCE24, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20101007-french-burqa-ban-
passes-last-legal-hurdle-constitutional-council-veil. 
 5. See Belgium’s Burqa Ban: Divided Country Finds Consensus on Islamic Veils, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,692212,00.html (describing 
the burqa ban as the only issue of the Flemish and Walloon linguistic groups in the country agree on); 
Michèle Laird, Burqa Ban Debate Enflames Switzerland, SWISSTER, May 17, 2010 (describing a 
proposed ban in Aargau); Marion Scott, Most Canadians agree with Quebec’s ban on burqa, 
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27,2010 (describing Quebec’s proposed burqa ban). On the other hand, a 
proposal for a ban on veils was recently rejected by the Premier of New South Wales, Australia. NSW 
Premier Rejects Burqa Ban Bill, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 23, 2010, http://news.smh.com.au/ 
breaking-news-national/nsw-premier-rejects-burqa-ban-bill-20100623-yw1t.html. 
 6. See SINE LEX ET AL., EUROPEAN UNIV. INST., PUBLIC AND POLITICAL DEBATES ON 
MULTICULTURAL CRISES IN DENMARK, 6 (2007); see also AMIKAM NACHMANI, EUROPE AND ITS 
MUSLIM MINORITIES: ASPECTS OF CONFLICT, ATTEMPTS AT ACCORD, 140 (2009) (describing 
Germany’s citizenship test, which includes a question about freedom of expression). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Swiss Voters Back Ban on Minarets, BBC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/8385069.stm. 
 9. See INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, THE SWISS REFERENDUM ON MINARETS: BACKGROUND AND 
AFTERMATH 6 (2010) (explaining that according to the briefing paper, 41% of French were opposed to 
the construction of new minarets and 59.3% of Belgians supported a ban on minaret construction). 
 10. For more on the cartoon controversy, see Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, The Danish 
Cartoon Controversy, and the New European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 253 (2010). 
 11. For an overview of Muslim objections to the cartoons, see Rachel Saloom, You Dropped a 
Bomb on Me, Denmark–A Legal Examination of the Cartoon Controversy and Responses as It Relates 
to the Prophet Muhammad and Islamic Law, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2006). 
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spoke of a "cultural battle" against Muslim immigrants who refused "to 
accept Danish culture and European values."12 
According to Flemming Rose, then-editor of the Jyllands Posten's 
culture page, the cartoons were a necessary step to stand up to the 
totalitarian threat of self-censorship posed by radical Muslims and also a 
way of introducing Muslims to the Danish "tradition" of satire.13 Although 
this language did not directly single out Muslims as such, in defending the 
cartoons Rose also spoke of high Muslim birth rates, compared Muslims 
unfavorably to Latinos in the United States, and accused radical Muslim 
leaders of engaging in a cult of"victimology" that ignored the "relatively 
high crime rates" among immigrant groups.14 
Supporters of anti-Muslim laws and policies often portray them as a 
necessary defense against an Islamic threat, a threat drawn from a post-
1945 Cold War perspective.15 Muslim religious leaders are branded as 
"fascists" and the Muslim headscarf becomes a symbol of totalitarianism; 
those who oppose publishing the Mohammed cartoons are decried as 
"appeasers."16 On one level, this framing makes sense since it reflects the 
historical experience of Europeans over the last hundred years. But it also 
has its problems. For one thing, the demands made by Muslims are 
religious as well as political. Furthermore, equating Islam with Europe's 
greatest inner demons overstates whatever challenges Muslims may pose to 
European liberalism while making compromise less likely.17 
 
 12. See Bent Nørby Bonde, How 12 Cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed Were Brought to Trigger 
an International Conflict, 28 NORDICOM REV. 33, 36 (2007) (reprinting Mikkelsen’s comments); see 
also Robert A. Kahn, The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Exclusivist Turn in European Civic 
Nationalism, 8 STUDIES IN ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 524, 528 (2008) (citing the harsher 
comments of Pia Kjærsgaard, leader of the far right Danish People's Party, who rejected the "clash of 
cultures" framework by asserting "there is only one civilisation and it is ours."). 
 13. Flemming Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html. 
 14. Id.; Flemming Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons, SPIEGEL ONLINE, May 31, 
2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,418930,00.html. 
 15. Robert A. Kahn, The Headscarf as a Threat: A Comparison of U.S. and German Legal 
Discourses, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 417 (2007). 
 16. For more on how totalitarian imagery plays into debates about Islam in Europe, see Kahn, 
supra note 10. 
 17. When, however, Muslims turn the analogy around and present themselves as victims of Nazi 
style polices, there are often sharp complaints. For example, consider Fereshta Ludin, the Afghani-born 
schoolteacher whose refusal to take off her headscarf led to a landmark headscarf case in Germany. She 
compared her situation to that of Jews “just before the Holocaust.” Kahn, supra note 15, at 433 n.132. 
In response, local Christian Democrat politicians wanted to prosecute her for Holocaust denial. Id. For 
more background on the argument that Muslims are going to be the next victims of the Holocaust, see 
NACHMANI, supra note 7, at 132-40. Interestingly, the German citizenship test contains no questions 
about the Holocaust. Id. at 140. 
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This Article proposes an alternate frame. What if Muslims—rather 
than being Soviets or Nazis-in-training—are the new Catholics? During the 
second half of the nineteenth century, a struggle erupted between Catholics 
and liberals over schools, civil marriage, and burial18—the same issues at 
the center of the current debates in Europe. The key event of this struggle 
was the German Kulturkampf (1871-1887), during which Otto von 
Bismarck, at the head of a coalition of German liberals and nationalists, led 
a campaign to separate German Catholics from the "reactionary" influences 
of the Papacy. The means for doing so included restrictions on religious 
speech, banning Jesuits, state assumption of civil marriage, and requiring 
new priests to swear an oath of loyalty to the German state.19 Across the 
Atlantic, state governments in the United States were busy passing laws 
banning public school teachers from wearing clerical garb.20 
Looking at current European developments through the lens of 
Kulturkampf has several advantages.21 First, it reinforces the idea that 
Islam—like Catholicism—is a religion, rather than simply a political 
ideology. Although there is a downside to viewing Islam—or any other 
faith—as devoid of politics,22 the focus on "political Islam" obscures the 
complex reasons Muslims engage in religious practices. A more religiously 
sensitive approach will help explain why bans on wearing headscarves is 
more complicated than simply banning Islamist ideology. 
 
 18. For a brief overview, see CHRISTOPHER CLARK & WOLFRAM KAISER, The European Culture 
Wars, in CULTURE WARS: SECULAR-CATHOLIC CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 1 
(Christopher Clark & Wolfram Kaiser eds., 2003). 
 19. RONALD J. ROSS, THE FAILURE OF BISMARCK’S KULTURKAMPF: CATHOLICISM AND STATE 
POWER IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 4-7 (1997). 
 20. Virgil C. Blum, Religious Liberty and the Religious Garb, 22 U. CHIC. L. REV. 875 (1955). 
 21. I am not the only one making this comparison. In a recent blog entry, Ates Altinordu links the 
anti-Catholic stereotypes of the Kulturkampf to the current stereotypes directed at Muslims. He 
concludes that European Muslims must work hard to make sure they do not become “the Catholics of 
tomorrow.” Ates Altinordu, Varieties of Anti-Religious Imagination, THE IMMANENT FRAME: 
SECULARISM, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Apr. 30, 2008), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/ 
04/30/varieties-of-anti-religious-imagination/. For a similar claim about anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim 
discourse from the perspective of the literature on democratization, see José Casanova, Catholic and 
Muslim Politics in Comparative Perspective, 1 TAIWAN JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 89, 89 (2005) 
(noting similarities between “the old discourse on Catholicism that prevailed in Anglo-Protestant 
societies” and “[t]he contemporary global discourse on Islam as a fundamentalist, antimodern and 
undemocratic religion.”). 
 22. To call radical Islam “fundamentalist”—just like labeling ultramontane Catholicism 
“reactionary”— undermines the modernist elements in both movements. This modernism is most 
apparent in the way both movements brought new voices into the political system. For an interesting 
series of essays making this point in the Islamic context, see MODERNIZING ISLAM: RELIGION AND THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST (John L. Esposito and François Burgat eds., 2003). 
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Second, focusing on European and U.S. anti-Catholicism raises the 
possibility that anti-Muslim policies are not just about defending Karl 
Popper's "the open society" against political extremists.23 Just as nineteenth 
century German liberals worried about the specifically religious content of 
Catholicism, high Catholic birth rates and Catholic cultural practices that 
differed from those favored by Protestants,24 current anti-Muslim sentiment 
in Europe turns on more than a fear of Muslim radicals.25 
Finally, to strike a prescriptive note, the anti-Catholic laws ultimately 
failed. For one thing, the laws often did not achieve their stated goals.26 
Bismarck's laws failed to separate German Catholics from a "reactionary" 
Rome, while in the United States the clerical garb laws did not prevent 
Catholics from teaching in public schools. Nor did the anti-Catholic laws 
and policies succeed in isolating Catholics from the rest of society. Herein 
lies a hope for the future—if the United States and Germany could come to 
terms with Catholicism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the same 
ought to be true of Europeans learning how to live with Muslims today. 
The remainder of this Article explores the Catholic–Muslim 
comparison in greater depth. Part I looks at how supporters of the 
Kulturkampf and clerical garb laws in the United States viewed the "threat" 
posed by Catholics. Part II turns to contemporary Europe and argues that 
many of the arguments used in today's debates over Islam are similar to the 
anti-Catholic discourse of the Kulturkampf. Part III switches focus to how 
the law operates in practice and recounts the practical difficulties that arose 
when the Kulturkampf and bans on clerical garb were enforced. Part IV 
uses these practical difficulties of past clothing bans to pose a series of 
speculative conclusions about current European bans on the headscarf and 
burqa. Finally, the Article closes on a hopeful note: the successful 
integration of Catholics in present day Germany and the United States 
today suggests that the fears behind the anti-Muslim laws and policies are 
overstated. 
 
 23. In his Washington Post op-ed piece defending his decision to publish the cartoons, Flemming 
Rose invoked Karl Popper’s THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945)—a classic text of Cold War 
liberalism—to highlight the importance of not tolerating the intolerant. Rose, supra note 13. 
 24. For more, see infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. 
 25. For more, see infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text. 
 26. This is the main thesis of Ross’s book. See ROSS, supra note 19, at 12-14 (arguing that the 
Kulturkampf demonstrates the limits of the power of the German state and national liberals to make 
policy). 
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I. THE KULTURKAMPF, CLERICAL GARB LAWS, AND ANTI-
CATHOLIC STEREOTYPES 
In discussing conflicts over Islam, writers sometimes use the term 
Kulturkampf, literally translated as "struggle between cultures."27 The 
reference is to Samuel Huntington, who argued that the current world is 
divided into discrete cultures and that the current age dominated by a "clash 
of civilizations."28 The term Kulturkampf, however, also has a narrower, 
historical meaning. It refers to an event that occurred within Europe—the 
struggle between "modern" liberals and a resurgent Catholic church during 
the nineteenth century. It is this narrower use of Kulturkampf that this 
Article seeks to explore. 
The nineteenth century conflicts between Catholics and liberals took 
place in various countries.29 However, the greatest conflict occurred in 
Germany, where Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, at the head of a coalition 
of nationalists and liberals, enacted a series of laws designed to separate 
German Catholics from the Pope.30 The arrests, prison sentences, and 
expulsions ruined lives of individual Catholics without ultimately 
advancing Bismarck's long-term goal of reducing Catholic influence in 
German social and political life.31 Small wonder other European liberals 
saw the Kulturkampf as an example of what to avoid.32 
To understand why the Kulturkampf came about despite its 
unpopularity, some historical background is necessary. During most of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the area currently known as Germany 
was made up of a loose confederation of small states, a few larger ones 
such as Bavaria, and Prussia, which by the mid-eighteenth century was 
 
 27. Timothy Garton Ash, Sarkozy Is Half Right: All Europeans Must Understand the Swiss 
Mistake, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2009 at 33 (criticizing the Swiss Minaret Ban, Garton Ash spoke of 
“the danger of sliding into a culture war, a Kulturkampf”). 
 28. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993). The use of the 
term Kulturkampf is not limited to Germans. For example, William Rees-Mogg, calling for new anti-
terrorism policies referred to the struggle against terrorism as “a Kulturkampf in Bismarck’s terms” 
William Rees-Mogg, This Time We Were Lucky, This Time…, THE TIMES (London), July, 2, 2007, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/william_rees_mogg/article1886870.ece. 
 29. See CLARK & KAISER, supra note 18, at 1-2 (noting that during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century there were major conflicts between Catholics and secular liberals in France, Belgium 
and Switzerland). 
 30. ROSS, supra note 19, at 4-8. 
 31. Id. at 7 (noting that Catholic civil servants were demoted or lost their jobs and rank and file 
Catholics found it hard to find priests to administer the sacraments” and that by 1880 “more than half of 
Prussia’s Catholic episcopate was in exile or prison, nearly a quarter of all parish priests were without 
pastors, and a third or more of all religious houses and congregations had been suppressed”). 
 32. CLARK & KAISER, supra note 18, at 4. 
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already a major European power.33 To the southeast stood the Habsburg 
Empire, a Catholic state that occupied many territories including present-
day Austria and the Czech Republic, both of which had large German 
speaking populations.34 As the idea of nationalism spread across Europe in 
the nineteenth century, Germans debated between having a "large" 
Germany that would include the German lands of the Habsburg Empire and 
having a "small" Germany that would leave them out.35 In the 1860s, 
matters came to a head and by 1871 a new German Empire had arisen—
one that excluded the Habsburg lands and was dominated by Prussia.36 
The unification process saw the new German state fight wars with 
Austria (1866) and France (1870-71)—both Catholic powers. By 1871, 
Catholics made up thirty-six percent of the German population.37 
Moreover, although its supporters believed they were fighting against 
"reactionary" Catholicism, the Kulturkampf itself was a reaction to a 
reinvigorated Catholic church. The mid-nineteenth century saw a 
considerable popular mobilization of Catholicism, including membership 
increases in Catholic institutions, as well as a new popular piety involving 
relics, plaster saints, and public rituals that made Protestants and some 
middle-class Catholics uncomfortable.38 
At the same time, Catholics were able to use the new democratic 
institutions established in the wake of the liberal revolution of 1848 that 
swept across the German states to gain a measure of political power.39 In 
 
 33. Until 1806 this confederation took the form of the Holy Roman Empire, nominally governed 
by a Habsburg prince who was also the Emperor of Austria and always a Catholic. E.J. PASSANT, A 
SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY 1-2 (1969). After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, this took the form of 
the German Confederation. Id. at 15-18. While dominated by Austria in its early years, the 
Confederation was no longer an explicitly Catholic body. Id. at 19-21 (describing 1815-58 as a period 
of Austrian dominance over the German Confederation). Meanwhile, Prussia—while religiously 
diverse—saw its mission as protecting the rights of Calvinists in the Holy Roman Empire. Id. at 3; see 
also MARY FULBROOK, A CONCISE HISTORY OF GERMANY 76 (1990) (describing Prussia as a 
“composite” state made up of Catholics and Lutherans as well as Calvinists). 
 34. PASSANT, supra note 33, at 8-9 (noting that the Habsburg Empire also included a large 
number of non-German minorities which weakened its claim to speak as a defender of German power). 
 35. Walter Schmidt, The Nation in German History, in THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN EUROPE IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 148, 161-62 (Mikuláš Teich and Ray Porter eds., 1993); see also ALAN 
WATSON, THE GERMANS: WHO THEY ARE NOW 32 (rev. ed. 1994) (describing Berlin and Vienna’s 
competing plans for German reunification). 
 36. For an overview, see FULBROOK, supra note 33, at 125-31. The new German Empire was 
federal—the Emperor ruled over foreign and military affairs, while the individual states retained control 
over domestic issues. ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 9-11 (3d ed. 1970). 
 37. Marjule Anne Drury, Anti-Catholicism in Germany, Britain, and the United States: A Review 
and Critique of Recent Scholarship, 70 CHURCH HISTORY 98, 111 (2001). 
 38. CLARK & KAISER, supra note 18, at 3; ROSS, supra note 19, at 23; Drury, supra note 38, at 
111, 117. 
 39. Martin Spahn, Kulturkampf, in 8 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, 703, 704 (1910). 
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1870—the year before Bismarck began instituting anti-Catholic laws—the 
Catholic-based Center Party won a massive electoral victory in the Prussian 
parliament.40 Added to this was the new assertiveness of the Papacy—as 
seen in the Syllabus of Errors (1864), which indicted liberal society, and 
the Decree on Papal Infallibility (1870), which suggested that the ultimate 
authority for German Catholics lay not in Berlin, but in Rome.41 
Although the renewed Catholic assertiveness of the mid-nineteenth 
century might have justified some response, German liberals exaggerated 
the threat and stereotyped Catholics in ways that followers of the current 
European debates over Islam will find familiar. First, German liberals cast 
the concern about Catholics in demographic terms. They worried, for 
example, about high Catholic birthrates and conversions through mixed-
marriages.42 These concerns remained robust despite Prussian authorities 
acknowledging that the Catholic population was not increasing and, in fact, 
most of the offspring of Catholic–Protestant marriages were being raised as 
Protestants.43 
Added to the demographic concerns were ethno-racial ones. Poles 
were almost entirely Catholic, and during this period, the German Empire 
included several provinces with large Polish minorities, including West 
Prussia and Silesia; in Posen, Poles made up 60% of the population.44 
Concerns arose that German Poles would revolt, as they had in Russian 
Poland a few years earlier.45 Because the Poles were overwhelming 
Catholic, German nationalists viewed Catholicism with suspicion. For 
example, when a celebration of the Papal Jubilee in 1871 was held in the 
 
 40. The Center Party increased its representation in the Prussian Parliament from five percent to 
around twenty percent. See Margaret Lavinia Anderson, The Kulturkampf and the Course of German 
History, 19 CENT. EUR. HIST. 82, 88-89 (2008). 
 41. See ROSS, supra note 19, at 5. 
 42. See id. at 5-7. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Shalom Reichman & Shlomo Hasson, A Cross-cultural Diffusion of Colonization: From Posen 
to Palestine, 74 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 57, 58 (1984). 
 45. The rebellion took place in 1863. See NORMAN DAVIES, HEART OF EUROPE: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF POLAND 166-68 (1985). Meanwhile, on the Russian side of the imperial frontier, Catholic 
Poles were subject to a Tsarist Russification campaign that, like its German counterpart, had a religious 
aspect to it. See Theodore R. Weeks, Russification: Word and Practice, 148 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. 
SOC’Y 471, 478-79 (2004) (describing how during the 1860s the Tsarist governor general of Russian 
Poland worried about the “polonizing” influence of Catholic and Uniate clergy). There are differences, 
however. The “modernization” theme—present in both the anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim discourses 
under discussion here—was not a major part of the Russian discourse about Catholics (although it was 
to a limited extent present in the discourse about Jews, who were seen as a having a medieval, Asian 
religion). Id. at 472. Instead, Catholics—while respected as having a high culture—were seen as getting 
in the way of a larger project of connecting people living in Lithuania and Poland with their true 
Russian identity. See id. 
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Polish language, nationalists worried about "the Polish tendencies of the 
Catholic hierarchy."46 
A third set of arguments involved categorizing the Church as anti-
modern. One argument focused on the growth of popular rituals. As noted, 
these rituals—which historian Marjule Anne Drury47 refers to as 
"devotional kitsch"—made Protestants and middle-class Catholics 
uncomfortable. German middle-class culture shied away from the culture 
of display typical of ultramontane Catholics.48 This was especially true of 
liberal Protestants, who were moving in the direction of a more secular, 
cultural view of religion.49 So, while Protestants began to view Sunday as a 
day for Beethoven and museums, Catholics spent their leisure time on 
numerous feast days as well as on "drunken and riotous" trips to pilgrimage 
sites.50 
In addition, there was a broader complaint that Catholics were 
superstitious and believed in miracles.51 The presence of such "backward" 
views among a large segment of the population confounded the claim that 
Germany was a modern nation. Added to this were economic claims—
claims that Catholics were underrepresented in schools, had low incomes, 
worked in marginal areas of the economy, and were generally excluded 
from the elites of society.52 Though such arguments could lay the basis for 
egalitarian reform, the response in Germany of the 1870s was to combat 
"Catholic backwardness, provincialism and cultural inferiority."53 
In this atmosphere, anti-Catholic horror stories flourished. Catholicism 
was associated with Jesuit conspiracies (including one supposedly 
responsible for the death of a lion at the Berlin zoo), wild stories of nuns 
and priests disregarding their vows of celibacy, and cruelty toward school 
children.54 These stories sometimes led to violence, as occurred during the 
 
 46. ROSS, supra note 19, at 22. According to Ross, the Poles, “[l]ike the communists of a later era 
. . . aroused the hostility and suspicion of the public . . . because of their alleged revolutionary potential, 
especially in the kingdom’s Polish provinces.” Id. 
 47. Drury, supra note 37, at 111. 
 48. See id. at 116. Ultramontanism refers to the idea developed from medieval times that the 
ultimate authority in the Catholic Church rests not with a secular prince but—beyond the mountains—
with the Pope. Umberto Benigni, Ultramontanism, 15 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 125 (1912). 
 49. See Drury, supra note 37, at 117. 
 50. Id. at 118-19. 
 51. ROSS, supra note 19, at 18. 
 52. Id. at 23-24. The socio-economic claims of Kulturkampf supporters sparked a debate in the 
late nineteenth century and played a formative role in Max Weber’s thought. For a summary of the 
debate, see Drury, supra note 37, at 121-31. 
 53. ROSS, supra note 19, at 23. 
 54. Id. at 18-20. 
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1869 Moabit riots, in which a mob of thousands attacked a Dominican 
chapel in Berlin after the priest was accused of sexual misconduct.55 Anti-
Catholic sentiment also found expression in the cartoons of Wilhelm 
Busch, whose book-length comic strip, Pater Filucius, satirized an 
avaricious Jesuit.56 Withheld for two years by German authorities because 
of fears it might offend Catholics, Pater Filucius was a best seller on its 
release in 1872.57 
A final strand of support for the Kulturkampf came from those who 
saw Catholics as agents of the Pope. In explaining this aspect of anti-
Catholic thought, the Catholic Encyclopedia partly blamed Bismarck's 
jealousy—for at the very moment Bismarck's Prussia succeeded in 
"restor[ing] to Germany its former imperial grandeur," Rome declared the 
infallibility of the Pope.58 But other liberals shared Bismarck's concerns, 
including historian Hans Delbrűck who in 1897—a full decade after the 
end of the Kulturkampf—could still say that the threat "social democracy" 
posed to the German Empire paled before that posed by ultramontane 
Catholicism.59 Inspired by fears that the Pope would use the infallibility 
decree to restore the Papacy's worldly powers,60 German liberals saw the 
Kulturkampf as part of a larger power struggle between the Papacy and the 
Holy Roman Empire.61 In this struggle, German Catholics were either 
pawns who were encouraged to break from the ultramontane policies of 
Pius IX or a "foreign element" in the German body politic.62 
The same forces that inspired the Kulturkampf were also present in the 
United States, a country that, like Germany, combined Protestant 
 
 55. Id. at 26. 
 56. For more, see Françoise Forster-Hahn, A Hero for All Seasons? Illustrations for Goethe’s 
“Faust” and the Course of Modern German History, 53 ZEITSCHRIFT FŰR KUNSTGESCHICHTE 511, 519 
(1990). However, Busch is much better known as the author of Max and Moritz, a pioneering work in 
the world of comics. 
 57. Richard H. Schaefer, Kulturkampf Then: Ludwig Windthorst vs. Bismarck, 1996 FIDELITY 
MAGAZINE 36, 38. 
 58. Spahn, supra note 39, at 706. 
 59. Quoted in Drury, supra note 37, at 114. 
 60. Id. 
 61. In his March 10, 1873 speech to the German House of Lords, Bismarck argued that the 
struggle with the Catholic Church was not “confessional,” but “political.” As such, it was part of “the 
age-old struggle between kingship and priesthood” one that “shaped the German history in the Middle 
Ages . . . in the form of the conflict between emperors and popes.” Otto von Bismarck, Speech to the 
Prussian House of Lords (1873), http://www.zum.de./psm/imperialismus/bismarck3e.php (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2011). Bismarck made the same point the previous year when he announced to the Reichstag 
that “we shall not go to Canossa” –a reference to German Emperor Henry IV, who in 1077 went to the 
Italian town and stood for three days bareheaded in the snow to submit to Papal authority. See ROSS, 
supra note 20, at 24-25. 
 62. See Drury, supra note 37, at 113. 
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dominance with a large Catholic minority.63 While organized anti-
Catholicism was present in American public life from the arrival of 
German and Irish Catholics in the 1830s until well into the twentieth 
century,64 the passage of clerical garb laws in the late nineteenth century 
casts an interesting light on the current debate over Muslim teachers 
wearing headscarves. 
As in Germany, part of the pressure for anti-Catholic laws in the 
United States arose at least in part from partisan causes—in this case 
conflicts between the Democratic and Republican parties.65 For example, in 
the mid-1870s a debate arose over the Blaine Amendment, which, had it 
passed, would have amended the Religion Clause of the First Amendment 
to ban public support for parochial education.66 The amendment was the 
creature of James Blaine, who sought the Republican nomination for 
President in 1876 and who believed that taking a stand against "sectarian" 
(i.e., Catholic) education would cement a relationship between 
Protestantism and the Republican Party.67 This was not an isolated 
example; then Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes won re-election in 1874 
by linking the Democrats to Catholic plotters.68 In the 1876 election the 
Republicans tried to tar the Democrat nominee, New York Governor 
Samuel Tilden, as too closely linked with the New York Catholic 
hierarchy.69 Further, Rhode Island considered legislation that would make 
it illegal to "dissuade" a parent from sending children to a public school.70 
While the Blaine Amendment ultimately failed,71 several states, 
including New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Indiana, passed laws 
 
 63. For a discussion of the position of Protestantism in the United States during the nineteenth 
century, see Robert T. Handy, The Protestant Quest for a Christian America, 22 CHURCH HIST. 8 
(1953). Meanwhile, as in Germany, Protestant dominance was accompanied by demographic growth of 
Catholics—the percentage of Catholics in the United States grew from five percent in 1850 to seventeen 
percent by 1906. Julie Byrne, Roman Catholics and Immigration in Nineteenth Century America, 
NAT’L HUMANITIES CENTER, http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nineteen/nkeyinfo/nromcath 
.htm (last updated Nov., 2000). 
 64. For a classic overview of the structures of White Anglo-Saxon Protestant dominance in the 
United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, see E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE 
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY & CASTE IN AMERICA (1964). 
 65. Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 54. 
 68. Id. at 49. 
 69. Id. at 57. 
 70. Id. at 55. 
 71. Once Blaine lost the battle for the 1876 Republican Presidential nomination to Hayes, his 
interest in the school funding issue waned and the bill failed in the Senate by four votes. Id. at 67. 
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making it illegal for teachers to wear clerical clothing while at school.72 
Supporters of these laws argued that by taking an oath of poverty, nuns, a 
major target of the clerical garb laws, lacked the moral independence 
necessary to teach children.73 Debates arose over whether nuns wore their 
clothing as a matter of choice74 and whether a ban on the nun's habit was 
necessary to preserve the state.75 The message conveyed by the wearer of 
clerical clothing also aroused suspicion: was it a factual statement that the 
wearer was Catholic, or part of a scheme for teaching Catholic beliefs?76 
Taken as a whole, the debate over clerical garb laws revealed a discomfort 
with religious difference that was shared by both by Kulturkampf 
proponents and many European liberal and secularist opponents of the 
hijab and burqa. 
II. RETURN OF THE KULTURKAMPF? LIBERAL FEARS OF ISLAM 
Although supporters of the Kulturkampf and clerical garb laws made 
their points decades before anyone took much notice of European Muslims, 
their arguments parallel those made by opponents of the hijab and burqa. 
This similarity suggests that the Muslim "threat" facing Europe is far from 
unique and that the best parallel to the current debate over the Muslim 
headscarf is not the failure of European democracies to fight totalitarians in 
the years before and after World War II, but rather Europe's long history of 
intolerance toward outsiders, including—for Protestant Europe of the 
1870s—Catholics. The following outlines the key similarities between the 
anti-Catholic prejudices of the Kulturkampf and the anti-Muslim biases that 
inform today's debate. 
Before doing this, however, it is necessary to briefly describe the rise 
of anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe. Although the encounter between 
Muslims and the West goes back for centuries,77 Muslims first came to 
Europe in large numbers in the years after 1945 as the continent sought to 
rebuild itself after the devastation of World War II.78 At this time, 
migration was not seen as problematic—in part because of the expectation 
 
 72. Blum, supra note 20, at 875-76. 
 73. See id. at 877. 
 74. Id. at 879. 
 75. Id. at 881. 
 76. See id. at 884-86. 
 77. For a brief overview of relations between Muslims and the West before 1945, see Jane L. 
Smith, Introduction, in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad ed. MUSLIMS IN THE WEST: FROM SOJOURNERS TO 
CITIZENS 3-4 (2002). 
 78. Id. at 4. 
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that the migrants, mostly male guest workers, would return home.79 
According to Islamic studies expert Jane L. Smith, during this period 
"Islam was seen as a kind of transient 'cultural baggage.'"80 
During the 1980s this model began to change. On the one hand, 
European countries began to encourage family reunification and a new 
group of Muslim asylum seekers fled to Europe.81 This coincided with the 
emergence of a generation of European born Muslims—the sons and 
daughters of the guest workers, many of who were frustrated by the 
treatment experienced by their parents.82 At the same time, the oil crises of 
the 1970s spread waves of unemployment across over Europe, which led to 
the accusation that "Arabs" were stealing European jobs.83 
Initially the conflict between Muslim migrants and "natives" focused 
on xenophobia, rather than concerns with the specifically Islamic nature of 
Muslim migrants. When, for example, in the early 1990s four right-wing 
extremists set fire to the house of a large Turkish family in Solingen, 
Germany killing five people, thousands of citizens gathered to honor the 
memory of the victims.84 The town's mayor spoke out against "hatred of 
foreigners" and for "a democratic, fair and tolerant Germany."85 The 
religious identity of the victims—clearly demonstrated by the fact that the 
coffins pointed toward Mecca86—did not appear significant of the time. 
Slowly, concerns about culture and religion became more prominent. 
One reason was the emergence of a specifically Islamic ideology of anti-
Western protest.87 At the same time, the emergence of European wide 
institutions triggered an identity crisis which, according to Raphaël Liogier, 
Sociology Professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Aix-en-
Provence, created a situation in which "Islam has become almost the only 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. See also Raphaël Liogier, Islam: A Scapegoat for Europe's Decadence—How Muslims 
Have Been Taken Hostage by Europe's Most Acute Civilizational Crisis Since WWII, HARV. INT’L REV. 
(Jan. 6, 2011), http://hir.harvard.edu/islam-a-scapegoat-for-europe-s-decadence. 
 83. Liogier, supra note 82. 
 84. Stephen Kinzer, Thousands of Germans Rally for Slain Turks, N. Y. TIMES (June 3, 1993), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE0DE143DF937A35755C0A965958260. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Liogier, supra note 82 (describing how Islam, “besides being a religion, henceforth acted as a 
sort of anti-racist and anti-colonial banner”). 
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Europe-wide negative element which European identities can define 
themselves against."88 
This result was a new questioning of "whether Muslims can or are 
willing to be integrated into European society and its political values."89 
The change took place quickly. In 1991 Fritz Bolkenstein, a liberal party 
leader in the Netherlands, triggered a scandal in his home country by 
suggesting the incompatibility of Muslim and Western values; by 2000 
such views would be mainstream.90 To take another example, the headscarf 
issue first came to prominence in France in 1989, when three headscarf 
wearing girls were expelled from a public school. According to Liogier, the 
debate that followed "gripped" the country.91 By 2004 France banned all 
headscarves in public schools with a good deal of public support.92 
It was against this background that European opponents of radical 
Islam began to speak of a "culture war."93 When they did so, they often fell 
back on many of the same categories used by Bismarck and his liberal 
supporters to describe Catholics.94 In a similar way, supporters of European 
headscarf laws raised many of the same concerns supporters of clerical 
garb laws raised about the nun's habit.95 
Like their nineteenth century predecessors, supporters of the twenty-
first century "culture war" express alarm at the demographic "surge" of 
Muslims, which will allegedly result in the creation of "Eurabia."96 And, as 
in the Kulturkampf, Europe's "defenders" tend to overstate the number of 
European Muslims: although Muslims make up no more than ten percent of 
 
 88. Id. Liogier notes that France, “once a world intellectual powerhouse,” now felt the “brunt” of 
becoming “a peripheral player at the fringes of the Anglosphere” while Europe felt that it no longer 
“count[ed] on the world stage.” Id. 
 89. Tariq Modood, Muslims and European Multiculturalism, OPEN DEMOCRACY (May 14, 2003), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/printpdf/1214. 
 90. Kahn, supra note 12, at 530. 
 91. Liogier, supra note 82.While Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of the right-wing, anti-immigrant 
National Front supported the expulsions, so did a number of people on the Left. See JONATHAN 
MARCUS, THE NATIONAL FRONT IN FRENCH POLITICS: THE RESISTIBLE RISE OF JEAN MARIE LE PEN, 
92-95 (1995). 
 92. Liogier, supra note 82. A December 2003 poll found 72% of the French in support of the then 
proposed ban on headscarves in public schools. BOWEN, supra note 2, at 124. 
 93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
 96. Daniel Pipes, Europe or Eurabia?, THE AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 15, 2008, 
www.danielpipes.org/article/5516. 
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the population in any European country, opponents warn that one day—
sooner rather than later—Europe will have a majority Muslim population.97 
Niall Ferguson, echoing similar fears about demographics, added that 
when he sees a minaret in Europe, it conjures up an image of "decline and 
fall."98 Of course, these concerns about demographics—even if true—only 
make sense if one assumes a fortiori that Muslim migrants are not 
Europeans (otherwise, why should an increase in Muslims suggest a 
decline?). This is similar to the view of German liberals who worried about 
Catholic birth rates.99 
Nor is there any lack of ethno-racism among today's culture warriors. 
Just as Bismarck and his supporters worried about the "revolutionary" 
potential of the Poles, proponents of the headscarf laws worry about 
Muslims disrupting European society.100 Just as Bismarck and the German 
nationalists feared revolution and a Polish take-over, opponents of the hijab 
and burqa associate them with a rejection of assimilation.101 Liberal Dutch 
MP Geert Wilders explained the Dutch proposal to ban the burqa: 
We don't want women to be ashamed to show who they are. Even if 
you have decided yourself to do that [wear a burqa] you should not do 
it in Holland, because we want you to be integrated, assimilated into 
Dutch society. If people cannot see who you are, or see one inch of 
your body or your face, I believe this is not the way to integrate into 
our society.102 
 
 97. According to Pipes, because of low European and high Muslim birth rates, Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam will be Muslim majority cities by 2015, and by 2050 Russia could become the first Muslim 
majority European country. Id. For a discussion of how demographics plays into fears of a Muslim 
dominated Europe, see NACHMANI, supra note 6, at 130-32. 
 98. Niall Ferguson, Op-Ed., Eurabia?, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 
04/04/magazine/04WWLN.html. 
 99. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
 100. The clearest parallel is the equation of Islam with terrorist acts such as the subway bombings 
in Madrid and London. For example, writing on the fifth anniversary of the 7/7 subway bombing, Stuart 
Reid wrote in the Catholic Herald that “[w]ithout a strong Islamic element in our nation, there would 
have been no 7/7.” Stuart Reid, The Lessons of 7/7: Islam, Tolerance and American Wars, CATHOLIC 
HERALD, Jul. 7, 2010, http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2010/07/07/the-lessons-of-
77-islam-tolerance-and-american-wars/. Reid then praised the French, Belgians and Swiss for “showing 
the way” by restricting minarets and burqas. Id. 
 101. This often is expressed in terms of fear that European Muslims will create parallel societies. 
See, e.g., Andrea Brandt and Cordula Meyer, A Parallel Muslim Universe, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Feb. 20, 
2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,467360,00.html (expressing fear that “Islamic 
associations are . . . accelerating the drift towards a parallel Muslim society”). 
 102. See Mark Mardell, Dutch MPs to Decide on Burqa Ban, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4616664.stm (quoting Wilders). 
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A dissenting judge in the 2003 Ludin case, in which the German 
Federal Constitutional Court invalidated a civil service ban on headscarves, 
made a similar point about the "German constitutional understanding" of 
women's clothing: "The free person shows their face."103 
Fears of a Muslim "revolution" also appear in the debate over Geert 
Wilders's 2008 film Fitna, which equates Islam with terrorism and calls for 
the end of Muslim immigration.104 Some of this sentiment comes from 
Wilders himself who argues that Islam "seeks to destroy our Western 
Civilization,"105 in similar vein to the way the Kulturkampf's supporters 
feared Catholics. In the debate over the film, Wilders has also become a 
martyr along the lines of Theo van Gogh, who is viewed by many as a 
victim of a culture war directed by Islam against the West.106 
Other concerns about immigrants are more prosaic. For example, 
Jyllands-Posten publisher Flemming Rose, defending his decision to run 
the Mohammed cartoons, referred to high immigrant crime rates.107 
Likewise, a blog calling on "native" Europeans to revolt against Muslims 
and the European Union associated Muslims with rapes, muggings, and 
property damage.108 This sentiment is similar to the class-based arguments 
 
 103. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] para. 123, 2003 (Ger.). The majority held, 
however, that state legislatures could ban civil servants from wearing headscarves. Id. at 282-83, 313. 
For an overview of the case, see Kahn, supra note 15, at 417-34. 
 104. For an overview of the film’s contents, see Timothy Garton-Ash, Intimidation and Censorship 
Are No Answer to this Inflammatory Film, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2008/apr/10/islam.religion. According to Garton Ash, the film consists of a series of 
film clips from terrorist acts, quotes from the Qur’an that have been used to justify violence, combined 
with what he calls an “alarmist” presentation of the danger Muslim migration poses to the Netherlands. 
Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Henryk M. Broder, Geert Wilders Is No Right-Wing Populist, SPIEGEL, Apr. 1. 2008. Theo 
van Gogh, a Dutch comedian and filmmaker, was murdered on November 2, 2004 while bicycling in 
Amsterdam by Mohammed Bouyeri, a young Moroccan immigrant upset about Van Gogh’s role in the 
making the film Submission. The film, which featured the words of the Qur’an placed on the thinly 
veiled body of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, was intended as a statement against domestic violence in Islam. See 
Jörg Victor, Theo Van Gogh Murdered on the Streets of Amsterdam, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE 
(Nov. 10, 2004), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/nov2004/gogh-n10.shtml. The murder and 
subsequent trial shook the nation. For two excellent book-length discussions, see RON EVERYMAN, THE 
ASSASSINATION OF THEO VAN GOGH: FROM SOCIAL DRAMA TO CULTURAL TRAUMA (2008); IAN 
BURUMA, MURDER IN AMSTERDAM: LIBERAL EUROPE, ISLAM AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE (2006). 
 107. Rose, supra note 13. As noted above, Rose compared Danish Muslims unfavorably to 
Hispanics in the United States. Id. For more on Rose’s arguments defending his decision to publish the 
cartoons, see Kahn, supra note 10. 
 108. Fjordman, Native Revolt: A European Declaration of Independence (May 17, 2007), 
http://www.islam-watch.org/Fjordman/European-Declaration-Independence.htm. 
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Kulturkampf supporters made about Catholics.109 And, as in the 1870s, 
there is little interest in egalitarian reform; this would, to use Rose's words, 
be giving in to the "cult of victimology."110 Instead, the headscarf 
represents the wearer's socio-economic inferiority, associating her with 
cleaning women and fruit and vegetable vendors.111 
The reference to fruit vendors leads to another similarity. Just as 
liberal supporters of the Kulturkampf saw Catholics as backwards and 
provincial—Islam's European critics view Islam as pre-modern. For 
example, Wilders has called the burqa "medieval."112 In an interview with 
the Jyllands Posten concerning the Danish cartoon affair, Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
informed readers that "Islam hasn't undergone all the reforms and 
adjustments which Christianity and Judaism have undergone over the last 
thousand years."113 Meanwhile, there have been calls for a Muslim 
"Reformation"114—an interesting request given that the Protestant 
Reformation was launched against the Catholic Church. 
Another similarity with the Kulturkampf is the use of imagery to 
define the pre-modern Other. Just as Busch's Pater Filucius, a book about 
an avaricious Jesuit, targeted Catholics, the Jyllands-Posten's twelve 
cartoons offended Muslim sensibilities. Likewise, cartoons played a role in 
the development of anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, culminating in the pictures appearing in Julius Streicher's Der 
Stürmer.115 Given this history, one wonders what precisely Flemming Rose 
and the supporters of the Danish cartoons had in mind when they invited 
Muslims to take part in a Danish/European tradition of satire. 
The United States' experience with clerical garb laws also parallels 
many of the concerns raised by opponents of the headscarf. As in the 
United States, Europeans have debated whether the headscarf states a fact 
 
 109. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
 110. Rose, supra note 13. 
 111. This, at least, is how the debate worked out in Germany. Supporters of the hijab countered by 
pointing out that headscarf wearers worked in a number of modern professions—including as teachers. 
Kahn, supra note 15, at 431. 
 112. Mardell, supra note 102. 
 113. The Twelve Muhammad Cartoons: A Survey of the European Press, SIGNANDSIGHT.COM (Feb. 
24, 2006), http://www.signandsight.com/features/590.html (translating and reprinting a JYLLANDS 
POSTEN interview with Ayaan Hirsi Alifrom Feb 7, 2006). 
 114. Diana Muir, Op-Ed., Risks in a Muslim Reformation, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/17/AR2007081701691.html. 
 115. Because of his activities with Der Stürmer, Streicher was tried and sentenced to death at 
Nuremburg. For a brief overview of the prosecution, see Christopher Scott Maravilla, Hate Speech as a 
War Crime: Public and Direct Incitement to Genocide in International Law, 17 TUL. J. OF INT’L & 
COMP. LAW 113, 117-19 (2008). 
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(that the wearer is Muslim) or sends a proselytizing message.116 In fact, in 
the 2003 Ludin case the court appointed experts to answer this very 
question.117 There was also a considerable debate about the freedom of the 
wearer. Just as people asked whether a nun, by virtue of her vows, was a 
pawn of the church, opponents of the headscarf often argue that it is worn 
out of family pressure.118 
The headscarf—like the nun's habit—is seen as a threat to the 
preservation of the state. Opponents worry about neutrality in both cases. 
Just as the Catholic nun teaching in public schools violated the U.S. 
constitutional understanding of church-state separation, the German teacher 
who wears a headscarf violates the German tradition of an independent 
civil service.119 And, in both cases, this neutrality was partially a pretext. 
As the debate in the United States over the Blaine Amendment shows, the 
Republican Party used separation of church and state to gain anti-Catholic 
votes.120 Likewise, I would argue that the concerns about civil service 
neutrality in Germany were only the tip of a much a larger debate about the 
role of Islam in society. 
What accounts for the similarities between the anti-Catholic 
arguments made during the Kulturkampf and the current anti-Muslim 
arguments made in Europe today? This is a complex and under-researched 
question. Peter O'Brien, an expert on anti-Islamic movements, has offered 
one intriguing possibility: liberals are unable to deal with groups they 
cannot convert to their cause.121 According to O'Brien: 
Muslims irk the European liberal because they refuse to convert, even 
after generations. They congregate in ethnic ghettos, form their own 
exclusive organizations. They forbid their children to attend public 
schools or attend Qur'an schools to unlearn what is taught in the public 
schools. They wear distinctive clothes.122 
 
 116. This was a major issue in the Ludin case. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 418-19. 
 117. Id. at 427. 
 118. Pascale Fournier & Gökçe Yurdakul, Unveiling Distribution: Muslim Women with 
Headscarves in France and Germany, in MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND ETHNOS 167-84 (Michal Y. 
Bondemann & Gökçe Yurdakul eds., 2006). 
 119. Kahn, supra note 15, at 428. 
 120. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. This is not to say that every supporter of 
church-state separation was anti-Catholic or vice versa. 
 121. O’Brien’s remarks are described in a press account of his May 2004 speech at UCLA. Leslie 
Evans, Is Europe Unable to Assimilate its Growing Islamic Minority?, UCLA INT’L INST. (May 26, 
2004), http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=11511. 
 122. Id. 
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Nineteenth century supporters of the Kulturkampf and clerical garb 
laws had similar concerns about Catholics who, from their perspective, 
clung to their reactionary ultramontanism, pre-modern rituals and 
distinctive clothing. Consequently, nineteenth century, liberals on both 
sides of the Atlantic responded with legal restrictions. But how effective 
were these laws? What do those laws tell us about current laws targeting 
Muslims? To those questions we now turn. 
III. THE KULTURKAMPF AND CLERICAL GARB LAWS IN 
PRACTICE 
Acting on growing anti-Catholic sentiments, Bismarck enacted a 
series of restrictive laws during the 1870s. In 1871, he passed a law making 
it illegal to make political speeches from the pulpit.123 The following year 
he excluded members of religious orders from teaching in public schools.124 
The May Laws of 1873—perhaps the key measure of the Kulturkampf—
placed the training and appointment of clergy in the hands of the state.125 
Other laws banned the Jesuits and required civil marriage.126 By these 
means, Bismarck and the national liberals had hoped to create a new 
German Catholic—that is to say, a moderate—who would support Berlin 
rather than Rome. 
Kulturkampf supporters had hoped for a "quick and easy victory over 
the church."127 Bismarck and his allies were convinced that the declaration 
of Papal infallibility had divided German Catholics.128 And, in fact, 
discontent had developed in German Catholic circles. A group of "Old 
Catholics"—made up of academics, civil servants, and other members of 
the middle class—did break away from the Church during the 1870s.129 
The Old Catholics opposed what they saw as Rome's usurpation of German 
political sovereignty.130 They also removed those elements of Catholic 
religious practice—including the Latin Mass, auricular confessions, clerical 
celibacy, and the cult of saints—that German liberals found problematic.131 
As such, the Old Catholics looked like ideal allies in Bismarck's campaign 
against the Pope. 
 
 123. ROSS, supra note 19, at 6. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 54. 
 128. Id. at 35. 
 129. Id. at 36-37. 
 130. Id. at 38. 
 131. Id. at 49. 
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These hopes proved illusory. Even at their peak in the mid-1870s, the 
Old Catholics never made up more than one percent of the Catholic 
population in Germany.132 Old Catholics failed to gain greater support for 
two reasons. First, though the Old Catholics captured some of the elite, 
they lacked the support of the rank and file. The same changes in ritual that 
made liberals happy kept the Catholic masses away—especially at a time 
when the Church as a whole was under attack.133 Second, for all the 
German liberals' talk of modernizing Catholicism, the state's financial 
support for the Old Catholics was lukewarm at best.134 Behind this apparent 
support was a continuing atmosphere of hostility toward Catholicism—
including Old Catholics.135 
More generally, Bismarck and his allies underestimated the will of the 
Catholics to resist. When the May Laws were passed, the district governor 
of Trier thought that "jailing a few priests" would be enough to ensure 
compliance with the registration requirement.136 Instead massive resistance 
ensued,137as well as clever schemes to get around the full force of the law. 
For instance, to prevent the state from confiscating church property of 
clergy who resisted registration, lay Catholics would purchase the property 
at a low price and then let the clergy member in question reside there.138 
By 1874, that the May Laws had failed was obvious. In a speech 
before Parliament, Bismarck demanded to know whether "the state [could] 
tolerate the continuous mocking of its laws" and called for more stringent 
legislation, which resulted in the 1875 Expulsion Law that subjected 
recalcitrant clergy to exile.139 However, as time went on and the resistance 
continued, German Catholics lost respect not only for the Kulturkampf but 
for the authority of law itself.140 Meanwhile, in the eastern provinces with 
large concentrations of Poles, authorities turned a blind eye to the Catholic 
 
 132. See id. at 41. 
 133. Id. at 49. 
 134. Id. at 43. 
 135. Id. at 41. As one anti-Catholic critic put it: “Before the infallibility the Catholics at the 
command of the pope believed that twice two were seven; now, however, when he wishes them to 
believe that twice four are nine [the Old Catholics] refuse to do so.” Id. (quoting Entry by Gregorovious 
on Apr. 7, 1872, in THE ROMAN JOURNALS OF FERDINAND GREGOROVIOUS 428 (Friedrich Althaus ed., 
Gustavus W. Hamilton trans., George Bell & Sons 1907)). 
 136. Id. at 54. 
 137. Id. at 61. By the end of the Kulturkampf, authorities in Trier had assessed 80,925 marks in 
fines and ordered clergy to serve 11,975 days in jail. Id. 
 138. Id. at 57. 
 139. Id. at 69-70. 
 140. Id. at 122. 
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resistance lest the end of ecclesiastical authority result in a general 
breakdown of law and order.141 
The Catholic resistance was aided by some unintended consequences 
of Bismarck's laws. Although Bismarck wanted to censor the Catholic 
newspapers, he needed them to carry his pronouncements.142 Likewise, the 
1874 law establishing compulsory civil marriage took pressure off the 
beleaguered Catholic clergy, which, because of the May Laws, was rapidly 
dwindling in numbers.143 The Kulturkampf also had partisan repercussions. 
Much to Bismarck's despair, the Catholic Center Party grew noticeably 
during the 1870s.144 The development of a powerful, assertive Catholic 
political party further weakened support for the Kulturkampf.145 
Although diplomatic negotiations between Berlin, Rome, and German 
Catholics lingered into the 1880s, the period of active repression was over 
by 1878. There were several external reasons for this including the death of 
Pius IX and a political alliance between the German Empire and Catholic 
Austria-Hungary—thus ending Germany's fear of being encircled by 
hostile Catholic powers.146 But equally important were conservative 
Protestant protests, the growing strength of the Center Party, and a general 
sense of exhaustion.147 Meanwhile, if the goal of the Kulturkampf was the 
isolation of German Catholics, it failed. Writing in 1908, the author of one 
Catholic Encyclopedia entry concluded that "[o]ne important consequence 
of the Kulturkampf was the earnest endeavor of the Catholics to obtain a 
greater influence in national and municipal affairs; how weak they were in 
both respects was clear to them only after the great conflict had begun."148 
The experiences in the United States with clerical garb laws followed 
a similar pattern. As we have seen, many states passed such laws in the late 
nineteenth century.149 When it came time, however, to use the laws, 
American opponents of Catholics encountered the same problems as their 
German counterparts. 
 
 141. Id. at 150. 
 142. Id. at 122. 
 143. Spahn, supra note 39, at 708. According to Spahn, but for the civil marriage law, “the Catholic 
population . . . given the absolute necessity of marriages, would have had to . . . either tolerate the state 
clergy or . . . bring pressure to bear on the Catholic clergy” to obey the new laws. Id. 
 144. ROSS, supra note 19, at 123-25. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Spahn, supra note 39, at 709. 
 147. Id. See also ROSS, supra note 19, at 68-69. 
 148. Spahn, supra note 39, at 710. 
 149. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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A good example of the these difficulties can be seen in Hysong v. 
Gallitzin Borough School District, a case involving the town of Gallitzin, 
population 3,000, which was roughly eighty percent Catholic.150 Several 
nuns were employed as teachers at the public school.151 Protestant students 
and parents sued, arguing that this practice violated Article 10 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, which—in the spirit of the Blaine 
Amendment—made it illegal to spend public money in support of "any 
sectarian school."152 
According to the Protestant plaintiffs, the nuns wore their "garb, 
insignia, and emblems . . . in such a manner as to impart to the children 
under their instruction certain religious and sectarian lessons[.]"153 The 
plaintiffs also expressed concern that the nuns, by renouncing their worldly 
names, subjected themselves to church discipline. The plaintiffs also 
alleged that the nuns were unable to converse with males over fourteen 
years old—which, they claimed, would prevent the teaching of hygiene.154 
There were also allegations that the nuns taught the Catechism during 
school hours and received visits from local priests.155 In its defense, the 
Church denied teaching the Catechism during school hours and said that 
nothing in the church rules prohibited nuns from conversing with members 
of the opposite sex or teaching hygiene.156 
At the trial thirty-seven witnesses testified about a wide variety of 
issues, including the meaning of the nun's oath of poverty and the nature of 
the requirement that nuns wear the habit. The nuns were not allowed to 
take off the habit either "on account of their work" or "because of the heat 
of the day."157 The Pennsylvania trial court sided with the defendants on the 
issue of teaching physical hygiene—there was simply no evidence that they 
could not teach the subject.158 Reviewing the case law, the court also found 
support for the idea that schools should not become "the medium for 
disseminating [religious] beliefs" but concluded that the school board's 
hiring of nuns, however unwise, would have to stand given the absence of 
 
 150. The material in this and the next paragraph comes from the lower court opinion in Hysong 
which is appended to the Supreme Court opinion in the LEXIS version of the case. Hysong v. Gallitzin 
Borough School District, No. 295, 1894 Pa. LEXIS 1133, at *17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1894). 
 151. See id. at *1. 
 152. Id. at *7. 
 153. Id. at *2. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at *3, *16. 
 156. Id. at *8-9. 
 157. Id. at *18. 
 158. Id. 
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any law explicitly banning the wearing of clerical garb.159 The court then 
helpfully pointed out that other states had much stricter laws.160 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion that was 
much more critical of the plaintiff's position.161 The Court noted that other 
religious groups—such as the Quakers—wore distinctive garb and asked 
whether courts were to decide whether "the cut of a man's coat" or "the 
color of a woman's gown" are evidence of "sectarian" teaching.162 There 
was, however, a vigorous dissent. By renouncing the world, nuns have 
"ceased to be civilians or secular persons."163 Although "taste or fashion in 
dress" should be favored by the "largest liberty," the clerical robes mark 
nuns off as "representatives of a particular order in a particular church 
whose lives have been dedicated to religious work under the direction of 
that church."164 This, claimed the dissent, was how the Protestant children 
of Gallitzin, Pennsylvania saw the nuns.165 
The following year, the Pennsylvania legislature responded by 
enacting a clerical garb law that had the goal of avoiding "all appearances 
of sectarianism . . . in the administration of the public schools[.]"166 Though 
the Pennsylvania law was upheld,167 the overall record of clerical garb laws 
has been mixed—with courts in North Dakota and Indiana striking down 
such laws on the basis that they were mere pretexts for anti-Catholic 
bias.168 On the other hand, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a state 
school board resolution banning clerical garb,169 and in 1986 the Oregon 
Supreme Court upheld that state's clerical garb law.170 
 
 159. Id. at *24, *31. 
 160. Id. at *33. 
 161. Id. at *58. 
 162. Id. at *55. 
 163. Id. at *59 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at *62. 
 165. Id. at *61-64. 
 166. Commonwealth v. Herr, 39 Pa. Super. 454, 468 (1910) (characterizing the legislature’s goal in 
enacting the statute regarding religious garb, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceeded to 
uphold). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Blum, supra note 20, at 875-76. 
 169. Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949, 968-69 (N.M. 1951). 
 170. Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 732 P.2d 298, 314 (Ore. 1986). In upholding Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 
342.650 in a case involving a Sikh, the Oregon Supreme Court stressed that the obligation of a teacher 
to adhere to religious neutrality was not limited to members of the majority religion. It then added 
that—while the plaintiff’s dress may seem like “an exotic curiosity”—one must also keep in mind that, 
given “[t]he tides of immigration and home grown religions,” what the court finds “exotic today may 
tomorrow gain many thousands of adherents and potential majority status in some communities.” In 
reaching this conclusion, the court mentioned the Know-Nothing movement of the mid-nineteenth 
century and the Blaine Amendment—both expressions of anti-Catholic nativism. Oddly enough, it saw 
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More recently, however, the trend has gone against clerical garb laws. 
Pennsylvania's clerical garb statute has been called into question as 
possibly violating the Establishment Clause because of its tendency to 
endorse a specific religious view.171 Oregon's clerical garb law was 
repealed in 2010.172 
One difficulty posed by clerical garb laws is determining whether the 
clothing in question is religious. Although this is relatively easy with the 
nun's habit, it is proven more difficult for other types of head covering, as 
exemplified in EEOC v. Reads, Inc.173 In Reads, an auxiliary teacher, 
Cynthia Moore, was dismissed for wearing a colored scarf on her head.174 
In ruling for Moore, the court noted that the company had presented no 
evidence that she wore the scarf for religious reasons.175 The court also 
noted that Moore and her Imam had made statements that the headscarf had 
no religious significance.176 This last evidence made the court a bit uneasy; 
while crediting the statements of Moore and the Imam, it explained that it 
had no wish to "rule on matters of compliance with the requirements of a 
particular religion."177 
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not have such qualms in a slightly 
different case, Mississippi Employment Security Commission v. 
McGlothin.178 Deborah McGlothin, a teacher, sought unemployment 
benefits after she was dismissed from her job as a school teacher in 
response to her wearing a religious head covering.179 The Mississippi 
Employment Security Commission argued that the head covering was an 
expression of McGlothin's Ethiopian cultural background—and that 
therefore she was not dismissed from her job because of her religion and 
 
these events as a reason to support the law, since they showed how easily religious beliefs could give 
rise to the type of “contention” that imperils religious neutrality. 
 171. See Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 536, 550 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 172. See Betsy Hammond, Governor Signs Repeal on Teachers’ Religious Dress; Ban Will Lift in 
July 2011, OREGONLIVE.COM (Apr. 1, 2010, 1:25 PM) http://www.oregonlive.com/education/ 
index.ssf/2010/04/governor_signs_repeal_on_teach.html (noting that the effort for repeal was lead by a 
broad coalition of interfaith and civil rights groups but was opposed by the Oregon ACLU, which 
warned that repeal risked endangering the “religious neutrality” of public schools); see also Coalition 
Seeks Repeal of Klan-era Ban on Religious Garb in Oregon Schools, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 
7, 2010), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/coalition_seeks_repeal_of_klan-era_ban_on 
_religious_garb_in_oregon_schools/#. 
 173. 759 F.Supp. 1150, 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
 174. Id. at 1153-54. 
 175. Id. at 1158. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1158 n.11. 
 178. 556 So.2d 324 (Miss. 1990). 
 179. Id. at 327. 
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was not entitled to benefits.180 In rejecting this argument, the court held that 
McGlothin was dismissed on religious grounds even though: (1) the 
Hebrew Israelite group to which she belonged did not require that women 
wear headdresses; (2) she did not regularly attend church services; and (3) 
she was "selective" in wearing the head covering.181 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted that "millions of women (and some men) 
around the world cover their head as a matter of religious and cultural 
custom" and that "many religious practices have a cultural component."182 
Although the history of the enforcement of clerical garb laws in the 
United States may lack the drama of the Kulturkampf, two themes emerge: 
(1) given the prevalence of religious clothing across a large number of 
faiths, laws that single out the clothing of Catholics (or Muslims) are 
increasingly likely to be seen as discriminatory; and (2) because people 
wear clothing for a wide variety of reasons, courts encounter great 
difficulty in determining whether a given item is, in fact, worn for religious 
reasons. 
IV. FOUR SPECULATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT TODAY'S ANTI-
HEADSCARF LAWS 
What then do the experiences of Germany and the United States in 
restricting public expressions of Catholicism suggest about Europe's anti-
headscarf laws? Here are four speculative conclusion. 
First, the headscarf and burqa bans will most likely not achieve the 
goal of "integrating" European Muslims, especially if one defines 
"integration" as separating "moderate" Muslims from their more extremist 
counterparts. Just as the imposition of the Kulturkampf made the Catholic 
rank-and-file less receptive to the Old Catholics' message, it is hard to see 
how banning the headscarf will win over ordinary Muslims. Bans will 
instead increase the likelihood that those women who continue to wear the 
headscarf (or burqa) will learn to see it not only as a religious duty but also 
as a symbol of resistance to secular Western society.183 More generally, the 
experience of the Kulturkampf suggests that measures aimed to suppress or 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 330. 
 182. Id. at 330-31. Interestingly, in holding for McGlothin, the court rejected an argument from the 
school board that her headscarf interfered with the teaching of health and hygiene—an argument that 
recalls earlier objections to nuns teaching hygiene, as well as some current objections to the hijab. 
 183. See Raphaël Liogier, France’s Attack on the Veil Is a Huge Blunder, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk (arguing against the French burqa ban by asserting that those women 
who, to avoid the burqa ban, stay at home will become more dependent on their families, more 
desperate, and ironically better targets for Islamist recruitment). 
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"regulate" a religious minority will in the end spur it to greater political 
mobilization—this at least was what happened with the rise of the Center 
Party and the determination of German Catholics to never again put 
themselves in a position where they could not respond to legal 
repression.184 
Second, the bans will be hard to enforce. As a practical matter, bans 
on religious behavior are very difficult to enforce. Religious practices, like 
wearing the headscarf, are part of daily life, even if, as in the case of 
Deborah McGlothin, they are incorporated selectively. As a result, 
restrictions encounter deep resistance. A comparison to the hate speech 
context is instructive. A ban on hate speech works politically because, in 
general, no one in society claims to be in favor of hate. As a result, the 
laws—even if they are ineffective—are not likely to antagonize any group 
in society.185 
By contrast, when Europeans ban the burqa or headscarf because it is 
a sign of "political Islam," "totalitarianism," or "extremism"—in the 
manner of the Kulturkampf in Germany and anti-Catholic hysteria in the 
United States—they insult Muslims even before the laws are enforced. 
Oddly for secular liberals, who generally seek to separate what one does in 
private with what one does in public,186 there is a great desire to unpack the 
meaning of the headscarf. Wouldn't it be more consistent with the liberal 
separation of public and private to ban the specific bad things the headscarf 
is said to represent—honor killing and terrorism, for example—rather than 
to ban a clothing item many women wear for completely unrelated reasons? 
Third, banning religious clothing from one faith raises questions about 
whether garments of other faiths should be banned as well. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hysong was troubled because Protestants, 
as well as Catholics, wore religious clothing.187 Likewise, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruling in Ludin left it unclear whether German states 
 
 184. See ROSS, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Mari J. Matusda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2338 (1989) (“To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate fear of all human 
beings.”) (emphasis added). For an insightful discussion of the historical development of hate speech 
bans, see Cyril Levitt, Introduction to UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND 
INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES, 3-15 (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993) (describing how 
many European democracies enacted hate speech laws in the 1960s and 70s). 
 186. See Jeff Weinraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY (Jeff Alan Weinraub & 
Krishan Kumar eds., 1997). For a classic critique, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
 187. Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough Sch. Dist., 30 A. 482 (Pa. 1894). 
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that had banned the headscarf would also be required to ban the crucifix.188 
The stakes in this debate are high. Banning the headscarf alone raises 
questions of religious discrimination; banning the headscarf and crucifix 
(and other religious symbols) risks pushing society in an overly secular 
direction. These questions are not merely academic. When, in the wake of 
the Ludin case, the then president of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Johannes Rau, suggested that any ban on headscarves should also apply to 
"a monk's habit or a crucifix," he was met with sharp criticism.189 
Fourth, because a headscarf can mean different things to different 
people, courts and legislatures will have to decide whether to focus on the 
wearer's motives, the impact on the audience (school children in the case of 
teachers), or the message sent to the larger society by wearing a headscarf. 
As Reads and McGlothin show, these are not easy questions. Should the 
ban apply where the garment is worn selectively or for non-religious 
reasons by someone who is unaffiliated with a religious group? Should the 
ban apply to someone who, though religious in other respects, wears the 
garment as a "fashion statement"? And how can a court—or anyone else—
determine whether school children interpret a headscarf as a statement of 
the fact their teacher is Muslim, as opposed to an effort to convert them to 
Islam? Given the large number of Muslim women who wear the headscarf 
in public, these questions are unlikely to go away anytime soon.190 
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE 
Despite these practical difficulties, the current trend in European 
politics favors bans on Islamic clothing.191 The bans draw support from a 
view that such clothing is, to use the words of French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, "contrary to our values and contrary to the ideals we have of a 
woman's dignity."192 As we have seen, in the late nineteenth century, 
similar concerns were raised about the nun's habit in the United States.193 
Today, however, concerns about the nun's habit, if expressed at all, are 
much fainter. Instead, at a time when bans on Islamic clothing are on the 
 
 188. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 429. 
 189. Id. at 430 n.111 (internal citations omitted). 
 190. In future work I want to show more direct parallels between the anti-Catholic laws of the 
nineteenth century and the current laws targeting Muslims. One interesting overlap involves citizenship. 
Just as Germany and Denmark today are requiring Muslims to take citizenship tests, the May Laws of 
1873 required clergy to pass examinations in philosophy and related subjects. See ROSS, supra note 19, 
at 54-55. 
 191. See Erlanger, supra note 1. 
 192. Id. (quoting Sarkozy). 
 193. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
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rise in Europe and elsewhere, anti-Catholic laws are notable for their 
obscurity. Viewed from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the 
anti-Catholicism of the Kulturkampf and clerical garb laws looks 
antiquated. Although pockets of anti-Catholicism persist in the United 
States and in Europe, the general picture has changed remarkably. The 
current government of the Federal Republic of Germany is led by the 
Christian Democrats, a successor to the German Center Party that combines 
Protestants and Catholics and, as such, symbolizes the acceptance of 
Catholics into German society.194 
Likewise, John F. Kennedy's election as president in 1960 showed the 
extent to which Catholics had become an accepted part of American social 
and political life. Writing on the occasion of Kennedy's funeral, E. Digby 
Baltzell noted how much had changed over the past 50 years. Explaining 
how "hope and faith rank higher than confidence in the hierarchy of human 
virtues," Baltzell continued: 
Theodore Roosevelt was a dreamer of dreams who dared to hope that 
America would, in the long run, conquer the values of caste and 
someday send a distinguished Catholic, and eventually a Jew, to the 
White House. Among other things, this funeral dramatized the fact that 
part of his hopes have now been realized.195 
Hope is not a stranger to Europe. One day, European Muslims will be 
as "integrated" into their society as U.S. and German Catholics are today. 
The path will not necessarily be an easy one, but when that time is reached, 
hopefully headscarf laws will be as passé as the Kulturkampf and clerical 
garb laws are today. 
 
 
 194. See Merkel Becomes German Chancellor, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
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ADENAUER, viii-x (1996). 
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